Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice

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There are two distinct bodies of research on candidate gender. The first argues that voters are not biased against female candidates. These studies are usually based on aggregate analyses of the success rates of male and female candidates. The second body of research argues that voters employ gender stereotypes when they evaluate candidates. These studies are usually based on experiments which manipulate candidate gender.

This study seeks to unite these literatures by incorporating gender stereotypes and hypothetical vote questions involving two candidates in one model. I argue that many voters have a baseline gender preference to vote for male over female candidates, or female over male candidates. Using original survey data, I find that this general predisposition or preference can be explained by gender stereotypes about candidate traits, beliefs, and issue competencies, and by voter gender. I also argue that this baseline preference affects voting behavior.

A significant body of scholarship argues that female candidates are as successful as male candidates in state legislative, statewide, and congressional elections (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Burrell 1994; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). According to many scholars, this evidence demonstrates that voters are not biased against female candidates (e.g., Darcy and Schramm 1977, 10). Yet, a second group of scholars demonstrates that voters use candidate gender to make inferences about candidate traits, beliefs, and issue positions (Sapiro 1981–1982; Sapiro 1983; Rosenwasser and Seale 1988; Leeper 1991; Huddy and Tarkildsen 1993; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1994; Matland 1994; Koch 2000; King and Matland 2000). For example, voters perceive male candidates as better at handling crime and foreign affairs, and female candidates as better at helping the poor and protecting women's rights.

In contrast to past research on this topic, I include both measures of gender stereotypes and hypothetical vote questions involving two candidates within a single dataset. I argue that the success of female candidates does not preclude an effect for gender stereotypes on voting behavior. Voters have a preference to vote for male over female candidates, or female over male candidates, which I call voters' "baseline gender preference": all else equal, some voters would rather vote for and be represented by a man, and some voters would rather vote for and be represented by a woman. I argue that this underlying predisposition to vote for male or female candidates can be explained by gender stereotypes about candidate beliefs, issue competency, and traits, and by voter gender.

I begin with a review of literature on stereotyping and candidate gender. Next, I introduce a model I call the gender schema theory and test it with original data. Finally, I present an experiment that surreptitiously manipulates candidate gender in order to assess the effect of the baseline preference on the vote.

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Most scholars have sought to determine if voters are willing to vote for women, or if they are biased against them (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Burrell 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Fox and Smith 1998). Yet voter bias may also advantage female candidates, as in 1992 (Burrell 1994). I do not use the term voter discrimination because relying on gender stereotypes may be a reasonable shortcut for voters who lack information about the candidates. Making logical guesses about who is better able to represent you is not necessarily the same as choosing the male candidate because you are unwilling to vote for any female candidate. Sexism, however, may partially explain what I call voters’ baseline gender preference.

Gender Stereotypes

Voters can use candidate gender as a “low-information shortcut” to estimate the candidate’s policy stands, as they might use other demographic characteristics or partisanship to evaluate political candidates (Popkin 1991). To analyze gender stereotypes, scholars commonly use a between-subjects experiment. Subjects are asked to evaluate a single candidate based on biographical information or a short speech, and the candidate is the same across subjects except for the candidate’s gender. These studies have demonstrated that subjects evaluate the same candidate differently solely because of the candidate’s gender: female candidates are perceived as possessing more feminine traits and fewer masculine traits than male candidates, and as better able to handle compassion and women’s rights issues; male candidates are perceived as better able to handle crime, defense, and foreign policy issues; and female candidates are rated as more likely to be liberal, Democratic, and feminist (Rosenwasser and Seale 1988; Leeper 1991; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1994; Matland 1994). National surveys have revealed similar stereotypes (Sapiro 1983; Burrell 1994). These stereotypes may come from stereotypes about men and women in general, or knowledge of the behavior of men and women in politics (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).

Scholars have not reached a consensus on whether gender stereotypes affect voting behavior. There is some indirect evidence that stereotypes affect the vote. Scholars argue that ideology and certain issue positions play a greater role in the vote decision in a male-female race because of gender stereotypes (Paolino 1995; Kahn 1996; Dolan 1998; McDermott 1997; McDermott 1998). These scholars present evidence consistent with a relationship between gender stereotypes and voting, but they provide no direct evidence because the National Election Studies do not include any measures of gender stereotypes.

In a more direct test of voter use of stereotypes, Koch (2000) finds that female Senate candidates are perceived to be more liberal than they actually are. He compares the public’s perceptions of candidates’ ideology with a measure of their actual ideology derived from roll-call votes. These stereotypes about ideology affect voting behavior. However, we do not know if gender stereotypes about candidate beliefs—beyond ideology—and competency on issues affect the vote decision. We know surprisingly little about the relationship between voting behavior and gender stereotypes.

Gender Schemas and the Vote Choice

In order to bring the gender stereotype and voting behavior literatures together, I argue for a gender schema theory. This theory has three main components. First, many voters have a baseline gender preference for male over female candidates, or female over male candidates. Like past scholars, I argue that voters use gender as a cue to make inferences about the candidates. But I argue that voters’ baseline preference is a standing predisposition, rather than an evaluation that occurs during a single electoral contest.

Second, this underlying gender preference can be explained by gender stereotypes and by respondent gender. Voters’ gender schemas—their hypotheses about the beliefs, traits, and issue competencies of political candidates based on candidate gender—lead to a preference for either a male or female candidate, all else equal. I also hypothesize that voter gender partially shapes the baseline gender preference.

Third, I argue that the baseline gender preference affects the vote decision. I therefore identify a mechanism
by which gender stereotypes affect voting behavior: gender stereotypes give rise to a general preference for male or female candidates that can be acted upon in an election. Candidate gender therefore has a more direct relationship to the vote than previous scholars have argued. This predisposition can be expected to shape candidate evaluation and the vote choice in low-information contexts.

One way to think about voters’ baseline gender preference is as a summary judgment about whether male or female candidates are best able to represent the voter, which is similar to Fiorina’s (1981) conception of party identification as a running tally of voters’ experiences with the parties. This running tally may not only reflect past experiences with actual female candidates and elected officials, but also reliance on stereotypes about men and women in society. Even if all voters held the same beliefs about the likely behavior of men and women in politics, the baseline preference would probably vary across individuals depending on the voter’s issue positions and the salience of those issues to the voter.

Since voters’ gender schemas may change over time, their baseline preference may change as well. Voters may update their baseline preference if they have new experiences with candidates and elected officials or if their gender stereotypes change, altering their long-term beliefs about male and female candidates. The rise of particular issues could also have an effect. For example, the importance of social security and education in the 1990s seemed to advantage female candidates.

That male and female candidates win their races at similar rates on average does not preclude the existence of an inclination to vote for male or female candidates; these preferences may cancel each other out in the aggregate. The impact of the baseline preference may be evident at the level of the individual voter, but may not be apparent when men’s and women’s success rates are aggregated across races. In addition, while female candidates perform about as well as male candidates overall, there is evidence of gender differences in the success rates of candidates in some types of races (Burrell 1994; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). The uneven distribution of preferences on candidate gender may help to explain the variation in female success rates across districts, types of races, and time.

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2 Rosenthal posits a somewhat different concept, which she terms a “preference for same-gender descriptive representation” (1995, 600).

3 There may be regional differences in women’s success rates as well (Fox 2000).

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Data and Methodology

To test this gender schema theory, I designed a telephone survey to include three types of measures that have not yet been included within a single study: gender stereotypes, voters’ baseline gender preference, and a hypothetical vote choice question involving two candidates. The survey used random digit dialing and was conducted in late March to mid-April 2000.

The sample consists of 455 residents of Ohio. Ohio is similar demographically to the nation, and its experience with women in elective office is similar to the nation as well. In 2000, women constituted 21.2 percent of the state legislature, compared to a national average of 22.5 percent. Ohio had a female lieutenant governor, as did eighteen other states. Three members of the U.S. House delegation from Ohio were women; in 2000, about half of all states had at least one woman serving in Congress.

The main dependent variable in the analyses is a measure of voters’ underlying propensity to prefer male or female candidates. Respondents were asked: “If two equally qualified candidates were running for office, one a man and the other a woman, do you think you would be more inclined to vote for the man or the woman?” Respondents were coded 1 if they preferred a woman, −1 if they preferred a man, and 0 if they did not know or said there was no difference. Women were more likely than men to state a preference and they were more likely than men to prefer the female candidate. Over half of respondents—51 percent of men and 62 percent of women—expressed a preference (see Table 1). Of those expressing

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4 The sample is similar to a nationally representative sample. It is also similar demographically to Ohio. Women are somewhat overrepresented in the sample (60 percent, compared to 51 percent in the 2000 Census), and African Americans are somewhat underrepresented (8 percent, compared to 12 percent in the 2000 Census). The political knowledge level of the sample is very similar to national samples. The response rate for the survey was 37 percent and the completion rate was 67 percent. The survey averaged twenty-two minutes in length. Respondents were told that the survey was about important political and social issues.

5 These data are from the Center for American Women and Politics (2000a; 2000b; 2000c).

6 This attitude is highly correlated with a similar question that specifies voting in the respondent’s party’s primary for the U.S. House of Representatives (r = .67). The question asked: “If two equally qualified candidates were running in the [Democratic/Republican] primary for the U.S. House of Representatives, one a man and the other a woman, do you think you would be more inclined to vote for the man or the woman?” Thus the generic vote question that I use to measure the baseline preference is similar if the question specifies a U.S. House race.

7 The relationship between gender and the baseline preference is statistically significant (χ² = 26.67, p < .01).
A possible concern about this measure is that respondents are unwilling to reveal their true preference. However, I will demonstrate that individuals who prefer a male or female candidate are systematically different from individuals who do not express a preference. In addition, the distribution of attitudes is not skewed toward the female candidate, which might be considered the socially desirable answer: social desirability cannot explain why about a third of men and a quarter of women expressed a preference for the male candidate. If respondents claim to be neutral because they are unwilling to state their preference out of a concern for social desirability, then this study may underestimate the number of voters who have a baseline preference.

I test four hypotheses about the origins of voters’ baseline gender preference. The first is that stereotypes about issue competency predict the baseline preference. Respondents were asked: “Now I’m going to read a list of issues. Please tell me who you think would probably do a better job of handling these issues in Congress: a man or a woman.” Respondents were asked about protecting social security, handling foreign affairs, and dealing with the crime problem. The order of these questions was randomized. The answers are coded −1 for man, 0 for neutral, and 1 for woman. Consistent with past research, men were perceived to be better able to handle crime and foreign affairs and women were perceived to be better able to handle social security (Sapiro 1983; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Burrell 1994; Matland 1994). 9 I expect these issue competency variables to be positively related to preferring a female candidate and negatively related to preferring a male candidate. Thus if a voter thinks female candidates are better able to handle the issues, then the voter should have a preference for female candidates.

The second hypothesis is that belief stereotypes predict the baseline preference. To measure issue closeness, respondents were asked: “Now please tell me who would be more likely to take these positions in Congress: a man or a woman.” Respondents were asked who would be more likely to: change politics as usual; take the respondent’s position on the level of government spending and services; and take the respondent’s position on abortion. 10 The order of these questions was random-

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8For example, the question wording in a 1992 ABC News/Washington Post poll is almost identical: “If two equally qualified candidates were running for office, one a man and the other a woman, would you be more inclined to vote for the man or the woman?” 38 percent were neutral, 25 percent chose the man, and 37 percent chose the woman. This slightly greater preference for the female candidate compared to my data may reflect the context of the 1992 Year of the Woman. Similar to my data, women were more likely to prefer the woman.

9Men and women were equally likely to express these gender stereotypes about issue competency.

10The survey item about changing politics as usual does not directly measure issue closeness. Unlike the abortion and government spending measures, this question asks who is more likely to change politics, not who is more likely to take the respondent’s position. I therefore constructed an issue closeness measure by interacting this measure with the respondent’s position on changing politics. Most respondents agreed with the statement “We need
ized. Most respondents thought women would be more likely to take their position on abortion. This attitude is positively correlated with the respondent's own position (r = .23), indicating that respondents who are more pro-choice are more likely to think that a woman would take their position. This correlation is stronger for women (r = .32) than for men (r = .14).11

Women had a smaller advantage on changing politics as usual.12 These advantages for women on abortion and changing politics are consistent with past research (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Burrell 1994). There was no clear gender advantage on government spending.

The third hypothesis is that trait stereotypes affect the baseline preference. The measure I use is agreement or disagreement with the statement “most men are better suited emotionally for politics than most women.”13 Agreement with this negative stereotype of female candidates should be associated with preferring the male candidate.

The fourth hypothesis is that the gender of the respondent predicts voters' baseline preference. Voters may have an in-group bias, favoring candidates who are from new people in Washington who want to change politics as usual"; 5 percent strongly disagreed; 14 percent disagreed but not strongly; 33 percent agreed but not strongly; and 48 percent strongly agreed. The issue closeness measure takes the values of -1, 0, or 1. For example, individuals who wanted to change politics as usual and thought a woman would be most likely to do so were coded 1, and individuals who did not want to change politics as usual, and thought a woman would be most likely to do so were coded -1.

11 The distribution of abortion attitudes in this sample is similar to national surveys: 18 percent thought abortion should be outlawed; 46 percent legal only in special cases; and 36 percent legal in all circumstances. Of respondents saying abortion should be outlawed, 45 percent thought a woman would be more likely to take their position, compared to 32 percent saying a man. In contrast, of respondents saying abortion should always be legal, 77 percent thought a woman would be more likely to take their position, and only 11 percent said a man. Thus pro-choice respondents were much more likely to prefer a woman on abortion. Why so many pro-choice respondents thought a woman would be more likely to take their position is not clear. It may result from the fact that the pro-life movement is predominantly female, or an expectation that a woman would be more sympathetic to preserving life than a man. In addition, being pro-choice is positively correlated with political knowledge, and so pro-choice respondents may be less knowledgeable about the abortion stances of female elites. However, it may also be the case that there is a projection effect, since the question asks whether a man or woman would be more likely to take the respondent's position.

12 Women were significantly more likely than men to prefer women on abortion and government spending. There was no gender difference on the change politics as usual stereotype.

13 On this question, 14 percent strongly agreed, 19 percent agreed but not strongly, 24 percent disagreed but not strongly, and 42 percent strongly disagreed.

their group (Brewer and Brown 1998). However, female voters may be more likely to exhibit this in-group bias. Candidate gender may be more salient to women since women are underrepresented in politics (Paolino 1995).

I also control for attitudinal and demographic variables that are thought to affect gender-related attitudes.14 I expect that African Americans, individuals with higher levels of education, and Democrats will be more likely to prefer female candidates, and that individuals who are older and who attend religious services frequently will be less likely. I also include the respondent's position on abortion, government spending, and defense spending. I do not have strong expectations for these issues, although liberal attitudes may predict preference for the female candidate. I include the respondent's attitude on changing politics as usual, since there may be a direct relationship between seeking change in politics and preferring female candidates. Female candidates are often seen as agents of change because politics has traditionally been a male domain. I include interviewer gender in the model as well. Kane and Macaulay (1993) and Huddy et al. (1997) have found gender of interviewer effects, with female interviewers often generating more egalitarian responses than male interviewers.15

I follow Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) in distinguishing among three domains of gender stereotypes about political candidates—beliefs, traits, and issue competency. Huddy and Terkildsen created reliable scales of stereotypical female traits and stereotypical male traits and several scales of issue domains.

This study measures stereotyping by directly asking respondents to assess the beliefs and issue competency of male and female candidates relative to each other. Past research on gender stereotypes has used the same approach, including survey questions similar to the ones used in this study (Sapiro 1983; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Burrell 1994; Rosenthal 1995). Experimental studies conducted on undergraduates (Sapiro 1981–1982; Leeper 1991;

14 These variables are coded as follows: respondent gender and interviewer gender are coded 1 for woman, 0 for man; race is coded 1 for African American, 0 otherwise; education is coded 1 to 4, ranging from high school or less to graduate education; party identification is coded 1 to 7, from strong Republican to strong Democrat; religious attendance is coded 1 to 5, from attendance at religious services every week to never; abortion is coded 1 to 3, from outlawed to legal in all circumstances; defense spending is coded 1 to 3, from more spending to less spending; government spending is coded 1 to 3, from less spending to more spending; and change politics as usual is coded 1 to 4, from strong disagreement to strong agreement. See the Appendix for descriptive statistics.

15 I also tested the interaction between respondent gender and interviewer gender, but these interactions were not statistically significant.
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Matland 1994), or the general public (Kahn 1994) have the advantage of measuring gender stereotypes surreptitiously. However, there are drawbacks in terms of generalizability. In addition, those studies only entail evaluating a single candidate without a referent, while actual elections involve choosing between two candidates. The advantage to the methodology employed here is that respondents are making a direct comparison between men and women. As discussed above, the surveys and experiments have reached similar conclusions about gender stereotypes.

The baseline gender preference is correlated with the gender stereotype measures of issue competency and beliefs, but not highly correlated. For example, the baseline gender preference is only moderately correlated with issue congruence on abortion ($r = .21$). Both the marginals and correlation coefficients indicate that voters make distinctions across the measures. I also conducted several tests of reliability using Cronbach’s alpha to ensure that these measures were indeed different constructs, as opposed to one underlying predisposition to stereotype. The seven stereotypes together or in groups do not create reliable scales. The stereotype measures also do not load onto a single factor.

Thus the measures of trait, belief, and issue competency stereotypes seem to represent distinct domains, some of which advantage male candidates, and some of which advantage female candidates. Voters make distinctions among domains of stereotypes (traits, beliefs, competency), issue areas (abortion, foreign affairs, etc.), and male versus female strengths. These stereotypes overlap to some extent, but do not represent a single underlying dimension.

### Analyses

Table 2 presents the model predicting voters’ underlying gender preference. The baseline preference—a man, a woman, or neutral—is the dependent variable in a multinomial logit model. The base category in the model is the neutral response.

These findings confirm the stereotype hypotheses. Column 1 presents the coefficients from the multinomial logit model. The coefficients are the log-odds of prefer-

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16 The trait stereotype question appeared early in the survey among a battery of agree/disagree questions. The baseline gender preference measure also appeared early in the survey. The other six stereotype measures about issue competency and beliefs appeared much later, towards the end of the second half of the survey. The baseline gender preference measure is more highly correlated with other variables that tap into voting and representation than the stereotypes. For example, the baseline preference is more highly correlated with a question about who the respondent would rather have represent them in Congress ($r = .58$), and a question about whether there should be more, fewer, or the same number of women in Congress than there are today ($r = .42$).

17 The stereotypes most highly correlated with the baseline preference are the trait measure ($r = .40$), government spending ($r = .35$), and foreign affairs ($r = .31$).

18 Only 10 percent of the sample gave the same answer across all eight items (e.g., preferring the man or woman across items, or remaining neutral across items).

19 Note that I include the seven stereotype measures in these analyses: the trait measure, the three issue competency measures, and the three belief measures. I exclude the baseline preference because it is a vote intention question, not a stereotype measure. My theory is similar to standard models of voting behavior in which assessments of candidate traits and issue positions are causally prior to the vote choice.

20 For the seven factor scale, $\alpha = .55$. I also grouped the female strengths together (social security, abortion, government spending, and changing politics), $\alpha = .33$, and the male strengths together (emotional suitability, crime, and foreign affairs), $\alpha = .54$, and examined the three issue competency measures ($\alpha = .31$) and the three belief measures ($\alpha = .21$). Past research has not reached a consensus on how gender stereotypes are interrelated (Deaux and Lewis 1984; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). To fully test the interrelationship of gender stereotypes, one would need multiple indicators of both stereotypical male and female strengths within each domain of stereotyping—traits, beliefs, and issue competency—to construct reliable scales. Ideally, one would also want multiple indicators of each issue area within each domain as well. Future research could also examine the priority that a politician is likely to give to an issue, which may be distinct from the candidate’s spatial position and competency on the issue.

21 I estimated several measurement models. A single-factor model with all seven measures fit the data less well than a model of three factors—issues, traits, and beliefs—and a model of two factors—male strengths versus female strengths. However, none of the models seem to represent the data accurately. I also tested for the presence of a common method factor in addition to a single stereotype factor because of possible correlated measurement error resulting from the similar question format. Using a technique similar to Nelson (1999), I estimated the existence of both a stereotype factor and a method factor. The existence of a method factor means that there is systematic error that results from a particular measurement procedure (Bollen and Paxton 1998). However, adding the method factor did not improve the fit of the model, and the method factor itself did not have significant variance.

22 The question wording of the survey items about issue competency is similar to that of past surveys. However, projection effects may result from the question wording for two of the belief measures—abortion and government spending. Future research might instead ask the respondent whether a man or woman would be more likely to take a particular position on each issue (e.g., liberal or conservative), rather than the respondent’s position.

23 I also estimated the model with just the demographic and issue variables, excluding the stereotype measures. The results were similar to the model presented in Table 2. Few of the standard demographic and issue variables predicted the baseline preference. Party identification explained preference for the male candidate,
TABLE 2  Voters’ Baseline Gender Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait Stereotype</th>
<th>Prefer Male Candidate</th>
<th>Prefer Female Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree, Men More</td>
<td>–.64**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionally Suited for Politics</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending</td>
<td>–.42*</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Politics as Usual</td>
<td>–.17</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Closeness Stereotypes</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>–.09</td>
<td>.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>–.69**</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>–.01</td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Female Respondent</td>
<td>–.40</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Interviewist</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>–.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>–.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>–.002</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.152)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>–.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>–1.28</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>–.14a</td>
<td>–.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Issue Positions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>–.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>–.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Spending</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>–.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Politics as Usual</td>
<td>–3.33a</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.138)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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n = 375, log likelihood = –317.30
χ² (36 df) = 183.55**

Cell entries are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

a p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

ring the male candidate relative to being neutral on the baseline preference question. Party identification has a negative effect, although it is only marginally statistically significant: being a Democrat is negatively related to preferring the male candidate. In addition, agreement with the notion of changing politics as usual has a negative effect on preferring the male candidate, though it is only marginally statistically significant.

There is a strong relationship between the trait stereotype and preferring the male candidate relative to being neutral. Disagreement with the statement that men are more emotionally suited for politics is negatively related to preferring the male candidate. Issue closeness matters as well: individuals who think men are more likely to take their position on government spending are more likely to prefer the male candidate. Abortion and changing politics as usual are not statistically significant. Finally, individuals who think men are better able to handle crime and foreign affairs—two stereotypically male issues—are more likely to prefer the male candidate relative to being neutral.

In sum, individuals who think men are more emotionally suited for politics, who think that men are more likely to take their position on government spending, and prefer men to handle stereotypically male issues are more likely to prefer the male candidate.

The coefficients in the second column give the log-odds of preferring the female candidate relative to being neutral on the baseline gender preference question. Fewer variables predict preference for the female candidate relative to the neutral category. One of the strongest predictors continues to be respondent gender: women prefer the female candidate.

There is no effect for the trait stereotype. However, individuals who think women are more likely to take their position on abortion—a stereotypically female strength—are more likely to prefer the female candidate. Finally, individuals who think women are better able to with Democrats less likely to prefer the male candidate. The only variable that predicted preferring the female candidate was being a woman: women were more likely to prefer women.

24 This result is consistent with King and Matland (2000), who found that Republicans were less likely to express willingness to vote for a Republican female candidate than the identical Republican male candidate.

25 This strong effect for the trait question may indicate voter prejudice and a general unwillingness to vote for women. However, it is also possible that question order partially contributed to the strong relationship between the two variables. The baseline preference question was the second question asked after the trait question, and so the respondent may have been primed by the trait question.
handle social security are more likely to prefer the female candidate. The stereotypes about government spending, changing politics as usual, foreign affairs, and crime are not statistically significant.26

These analyses demonstrate that gender stereotypes explain voters’ baseline gender preference. Individuals who think men are more emotionally suited for politics than women, who think men are more likely to take their position on government spending, and prefer men to handle stereotypically male issues (crime and foreign affairs) are more likely to prefer the male candidate. Women voters and individuals who think women are more likely to take their position on abortion and prefer women to handle stereotypically female issues (social security) prefer the female candidate.27

Given the difficulty of interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients in a multinomial logit model, it is useful to examine some predicted probabilities (see Table 3).28 These probabilities demonstrate that gender stereotypes have a substantively significant effect on voters’ baseline gender preference. For example, women have a probability of .44 of preferring the female candidate, whereas men have a .15 probability of preferring the female candidate. Individuals who think women would be more likely to take their position on abortion have a .37 probability of preferring the female candidate, and a probability of .18 of preferring the male candidate. Individuals who strongly agree that men are more emotionally suited for politics have a probability of .48 of preferring the male candidate, and a .20 probability of preferring the female candidate.29

I also estimated the model separately by gender to determine if the model could explain both men’s and women’s attitudes. The results were similar to the results in Table 2, with only a few exceptions.30

26 The lack of stronger effects for the change politics as usual stereotype may result from the way that the measure was constructed. Recall that unlike the other two issue closeness measures, this measure was created from two separate measures of changing politics: the respondent’s position on the issue, and the respondent’s view of whether a man or a woman in Congress would be more likely to change politics.

27 I also tested for interactions of the abortion stereotype with respondent gender and the respondent’s abortion position. Being pro-life, pro-choice, or a woman did not interact with the abortion stereotype. I also examined the belief and issue competency stereotypes to check for nonlinear effects, since I make the assumption in the model that the effects of these variables are linear. I used an ordered probit model to estimate the effects of these stereotypes on the baseline preference measure, creating two dummy variables for each stereotype measure—prefer man (0,1) and prefer woman (0,1). Most of the effects were indeed linear; preferring a man was negatively related to the baseline preference, and preferring a woman was positively related. However, the government spending measure was nonlinear: preferring a man and preferring a woman relative to being neutral were both positively related to the baseline preference measure, though the effect for preferring a man was not statistically significant. Most of the stereotype effects were also symmetrical.

28 To calculate these predicted probabilities, all variables were set to their means.

29 Only 14 percent of the sample strongly agreed that most men were more emotionally suited for politics than women. 19 percent agreed but not strongly. This group had a .33 probability of preferring the male candidate; a .42 probability of being neutral; and a .25 probability of preferring the female candidate. 24 percent of the sample disagreed that men were emotionally suited for politics, but not strongly. This group had a .20 probability of preferring the male candidate; a .49 probability of being neutral; and a .30 probability of preferring the female candidate.

30 Several variables declined in statistical significance for men, most likely because of the smaller n. The effect of issue competency on foreign affairs on preferring the male candidate became marginally statistically significant (p = .10). The same was true for the effect of issue congruence on abortion on preference for the female candidate (p = .07). The effects of issue congruence on government spending on support for the male candidate, and the effects of social security competence on the female candidate, failed

---

**Table 3** Predicted Probabilities, Voters’ Baseline Gender Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prefer Male Candidate</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Prefer Female Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Respondent</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondent</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong agreement, men are more emotionally suited for politics</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong disagreement, men are more emotionally suited for politics</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man in Congress is more likely to take respondent’s position on abortion</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman in Congress is more likely to take respondent’s position on abortion</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man in Congress is better able to handle foreign affairs</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman in Congress is better able to handle foreign affairs</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These predicted probabilities were calculated by varying the key measures of interest and holding all other variables constant at their means.
The Vote Choice: A Test of Validity

The final component of the study seeks to demonstrate the validity of the baseline gender preference measure. I hypothesize that voters’ baseline preference affects the vote choice in male-female races. In order to test this hypothesis, I conducted an experiment that is similar to previous studies on gender bias and candidate evaluation. The experiment appeared near the very end of the survey.31

Respondents hear short biographies of two candidates running in a primary race for the U.S. House of Representatives. They are then asked to choose between the two candidates. Party is held constant. The gender of the first candidate (Brown) is manipulated. Respondents are randomly assigned into one of two conditions: the female candidate condition (a female-male race) and the male candidate condition (a male-male race). The following question is the male candidate condition:

Suppose two candidates were running in your party’s primary for the U.S. House of Representatives. Both candidates are attorneys. The first candidate, Thomas Brown, is age 45. He has been active in government and politics for his entire professional life and his campaign slogan is “we need experienced leadership.” The second candidate, Robert Harris, is age 35. He is new to politics and his campaign slogan is “it’s time for a change.” If you were voting in this election, do you think you would be more likely to vote for Thomas Brown or Robert Harris?

to achieve statistical significance, though the signs remained in the right direction. The main difference between the full sample and modeling women alone was that changing politics as usual became statistically significant in predicting support for the male candidate. In addition, education became statistically significant in predicting support for the female candidate, with a positive effect. Overall, the model works similarly for men and women.

31 The question measuring voters’ baseline gender preference appeared near the beginning of the survey. A considerable amount of time elapsed between the two questions, and many survey questions on issue opinions unrelated to gender stereotypes appeared in between the baseline preference question and the Brown experiment. Voting for Elizabeth Brown is not correlated with the baseline preference (r = .03, p = .64). Most respondents, regardless of their baseline preference, preferred Elizabeth Brown. For example, 60 percent of respondents preferring male candidates supported her, as did 64 percent of respondents preferring female candidates. Another survey question that was not analyzed in this article appeared closer on the survey to the Brown experiment. It asked the respondent who they would prefer to have represent them in Congress—a man or a woman. This question was also not correlated with voting for Elizabeth Brown (r = -.06, p = .42).

The female candidate condition is the same except that “Elizabeth” is substituted for “Thomas.” The biography of the opponent, Robert Harris, remains the same in both conditions. The order in which Brown and Harris are presented is randomized. This experiment enables me to surreptitiously manipulate candidate gender in order to assess the impact of candidate gender on the vote. The main difference between the candidates is that Harris is younger, new to politics, and more change-oriented. The candidates’ age, experience, and campaign slogans are included to give the respondent an opportunity to legitimize or rationalize their vote choice (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986): respondents can attribute their choice to information other than gender.

I hypothesize that the vote can be predicted with the baseline gender preference in the female candidate condition. The effect of the baseline preference should be conditional on the gender manipulation: individuals who prefer a female candidate should be more likely to vote for Brown in the female candidate condition than in the male candidate condition. Conversely, individuals who prefer a male candidate should be more likely to vote for Brown in the male candidate condition. In other words, the effect of the baseline gender preference on the vote should depend on whether the race is male-male or male-female.

I estimate the vote for Brown with a logistic regression model (see Table 4). Manipulated candidate gender and interviewer gender are included in the model. Support for changing politics as usual is controlled, since I expect that Harris should appeal to voters favoring change—regardless of whether Brown is a man or a woman.

The positive coefficient for the female candidate condition means that there is a main effect for the gender manipulation: Elizabeth Brown attracts more votes than Thomas Brown. The main variables of interest are interaction terms that estimate the effect of the baseline preference measure in each condition: the male candidate condition and the female candidate condition. I expect that this interaction term will be statistically significant if Brown is a woman: voters who prefer female candidates should be more likely to vote for Brown. However, I do not expect that the interaction term will be significant if Brown is a man.

Contrary to my hypothesis, the results in Table 4 indicate that voters’ baseline gender preference matters in the male candidate condition, but not the female candidate condition.32 The baseline gender preference is

32 The main relationship I am positing is that stereotypes indirectly affect the vote: gender stereotypes lead to a standing predisposition
negative in the male candidate condition, indicating that voters who prefer female candidates are less likely to vote for Brown. However, the baseline gender preference does not have an effect in the female candidate condition. As expected, individuals who would like to change politics as usual are less likely to vote for Brown, since Brown's opponent is the change-oriented candidate. Desiring a change in politics is negatively related to voting for Brown, who is older and more experienced than Harris.

I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting for Thomas and Elizabeth Brown for each group on the gender preference question: respondents who prefer male candidates, neutral respondents, and respondents who prefer female candidates. Voters who prefer female candidates have only a .32 probability of voting for Thomas Brown. However, if Brown is a woman, the probability that these voters will vote for Brown increases dramatically: voters who prefer female candidates have a probability of .65 of voting for Elizabeth Brown. Thus for individuals preferring female candidates, having the option of voting for a female candidate leads them to change their vote choice.

Support for Brown also increases among voters who are neutral on the baseline preference question if Brown is a woman, although the change in support for Brown is not large. These voters move from being indifferent to the candidates to preferring Brown: they have a .49 probability of voting for Thomas Brown, and a .62 probability of voting for Elizabeth Brown. Among voters who prefer male candidates, support for Brown decreases somewhat, but these voters continue to support Brown even if Brown is a woman: they have a .66 probability of voting for Thomas Brown, and a .59 probability of voting for Elizabeth Brown. They do not defect from Brown when Brown is a woman.

The baseline gender preference interacted with the experimental manipulation, with implications for voting behavior. Voters who prefer female candidates were much more likely to vote for the female candidate than the identical male candidate. These voters preferred Harris over Brown when Brown was a man, probably because Harris was change-oriented. Preferring change was negatively related to preferring male candidates (see Table 2). Since preferring change is more typical of female candidates, Harris's support of change may have led these voters to infer that Harris would take other positions more typical of female candidates. Thus in a male-male race, voters preferring female candidates may look to the male candidate who is more likely to provide the type of representation that they expect from female candidates. In the male candidate condition, voters preferring female candidates supported Harris, but their vote choice changed when an actual female candidate was in the race. They defected from Harris when Brown was a woman—even though the description of Harris did not change. When given a chance to vote for a woman, these voters responded.

It could be argued that the Elizabeth Brown candidate defied gender stereotypes: she was the experienced candidate while her opponent promised change. She therefore may be a somewhat atypical female candidate and less likely to be perceived as an agent of change than other female candidates. The particular biographies of both candidates no doubt interacted with the baseline gender preference effect. However, it is possible that change-oriented voters perceived Elizabeth Brown as more likely to effect change because she was an outsider by virtue of her gender. Harris made change his slogan, but it is women as a group who have traditionally been the outsiders. Brown was identified as experienced, but not as the incumbent. Traditionally, female candidates

---

**Table 4 Vote Choice Model, Brown Experiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote for Brown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Candidate Condition</td>
<td>.52* (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Gender Preference x Male Candidate Condition</td>
<td>-.70** (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Gender Preference Female Candidate Condition</td>
<td>.14 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Politics as Usual Male Candidate Condition</td>
<td>-.51** (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Interviewer</td>
<td>.09 (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.64** (.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ n = 384, \log \text{likelihood} = -244.70 \]
\[ \chi^2 (5 \text{ df}) = 36.40** \]

Cell entries are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

\* p < .05, ** p < .01

---

33 To calculate these predicted probabilities, interviewer gender was set to 0 (male) and the change politics as usual variable measure was set to its mean.
have had to emphasize their experience in order to overcome the stereotype that they are less qualified or less competent than their male opponents (Witt, Paget, and Matthews 1994). Respondents might have expected Elizabeth Brown to have a more distinct leadership style or to bring a new perspective to office as a woman, even though she was the more experienced candidate.

In addition, voter stereotypes may operate even if there is little truth to them. This may explain why voters preferring female candidates switched from Harris in the male-male contest to Brown in the male-female contest, and why the baseline preference had an impact in the male candidate condition. In the female candidate condition, voters preferring female candidates probably felt cross-pressured, since a change-oriented man was pitted against a woman.

It is not clear why voters’ baseline gender preference affected the vote in the male candidate condition, but not the female candidate condition. The main puzzle is why voters preferring male candidates continued to support Brown even when she was a woman. The characteristics of Brown as the older, more experienced candidate may have been sufficient to outweigh these voters’ usual doubts about female candidates. Thus with a different combination of candidate characteristics, these voters might have acted on their baseline preference. For example, if the gender of Harris had been manipulated instead of that of Brown—if Harris had been the younger, less experienced candidate, as opposed to the older, more experienced candidate—then voters who prefer male candidates might have been much more likely to vote for Brown when Harris was female. The combination of an experienced, female candidate running against a change-oriented, younger male candidate may have diminished the effect of the baseline preference for these voters. The effect of voters’ preference for candidate gender is likely to depend on the particular electoral contests.

**Discussion**

This study did not examine the effect of voters’ gender preference on actual voting behavior, but the results presented here are consistent with a number of existing studies. For example, Paolino (1995) found that voters who felt it was important to elect more women to the Senate were more likely to vote for female senatorial candidates in 1992. His findings are consistent with the idea that attitudes toward female candidates in the abstract have an impact on actual voting behavior.

In addition, there is some evidence of gender-based voting behavior—with women preferring female candidates and men preferring male candidates—although the evidence is mixed (King and Matland 2000). It may be somewhat surprising that the gender affinity effect that I identify has not found more support in actual elections. For example, Paolino (1995) and McDermott (1997) did not find gender effects in congressional races.

However, other scholars have found gender effects. Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton (1997) and Plutzer and Zipp (1996) found gender effects in statewide races. And there is also evidence of gender effects in low-information contexts and in contexts where party is not available as a cue. For example, Dolan (1998) found that women were significantly more likely than men to vote for female House candidates in 1992. Cook (1994) found gender gaps in the 1992 Democratic Senate primaries, with more women than men supporting female candidates. In addition, Zipp and Plutzer (1985) found significant gender effects in statewide elections in 1982, especially among Independent women.

It is also important to remember that voter gender is only part of the explanation for voters’ baseline preference; not only voter gender, but stereotypes about traits, beliefs, and issue competency explain the baseline gender preference. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the gender effect is not even more prevalent.

Finally, female candidates seem to be advantaged in campaigns that play to their strengths (Kahn 1996). Using data from the 1988–1992 Senate National Election Study, Kahn found that female candidates fared better in campaign contexts that featured stereotypically female, as opposed to male, themes. This finding is consistent with the argument presented here. If voters’ inclination to support female candidates results from the fact that they think women will be more competent on particular issues, then it is a logical extension to argue that women will perform better if those issues are emphasized in the campaign. If female candidates do not champion the agenda that voters hope they will champion, then they may not benefit from voters’ baseline gender preference.

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34 For example, Harriett Woods, former president of the National Women’s Political Caucus, argues that women may be “regarded as outsiders even when they’re insiders” (Freivogel 1992). This seems to have been the case with Barbara Boxer’s 1992 Senate campaign (Tolleson Rinehart 1994).

35 I also split the sample into three groups and estimated the effect of the experiment on each group: individuals who prefer male candidates, individuals who are neutral, and individuals who prefer female candidates. The experiment affected the vote for neutral and female candidate voters, but not for male candidate voters.

36 Cook (1994) argued that these gender gaps were reduced when ideology was taken into account, but she did not conduct a multivariate analysis of the vote.
Conclusion

This article has argued that many voters—about half of the voters in this sample—have a predisposition to support female over male candidates, or vice versa. This baseline gender preference can be explained by voter gender and by gender stereotypes about traits, beliefs, and issue competency. This article has also provided preliminary evidence that this baseline preference can affect the vote decision.

Despite tremendous liberalization in attitudes toward women in politics, voters do take gender into account when they evaluate candidates. The gender stereotypes identified in this article are consistent with past research. However, this study has gone beyond the existing literature by identifying a mechanism by which these stereotypes affect the vote choice. Voters' gender schemas give rise to a baseline preference to support either male or female candidates. The preference for male candidates can be explained by negative stereotypes about female traits, positive stereotypes about men's ability to handle stereotypically male issues, and the perception that male candidates are closer to the respondent on government spending. The preference for female candidates can be explained by voter gender and by positive stereotypes about women's positions on and ability to handle stereotypically female issues.

Research on gender stereotypes has a parallel in the literature on racial politics. Similar to scholars of gender stereotypes, scholars have analyzed racial stereotypes about candidate traits, beliefs, and issue competency. I do not claim that my findings are generalizable to race, since there are several reasons to believe that the effects of stereotypes on voting differ for race and gender. But future research could compare the role of racial stereotypes and gender stereotypes in candidate evaluation. Past research on racial stereotypes has often held gender constant by examining voter reaction to black male candidates (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Terkildsen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1995; Reeves 1997; McDermott 1998). Most studies of gender stereotypes, including this one, have not varied the race of the candidates, and so it is not clear if gender stereotypes work the same way across candidates of different races or ethnicities. How race and gender stereotypes interact is an important area for future research.

This study has several implications for research on voting behavior and gender politics. First, voter stereotypes about candidate traits, beliefs, and issue competency matter because they give rise to a predisposition to vote for male or female candidates. More research is needed in order to understand how this baseline gender preference affects voting behavior. If voters lack information about candidates in a low-information race, or if they lack the party cue in a primary, then voters' baseline preference can be expected to play a greater role. The effect of the baseline preference probably depends on other aspects of the electoral context as well, including the issues emphasized in the campaign and the salience of gender identity in the election. More research is also needed on how voters' baseline preference interacts with different types of candidates. In the experiment, party was controlled, but voters had other information about the candidates. The particular combination of candidate characteristics in the experiment diminished the impact of the baseline gender preference for voters who prefer male candidates. This implies that voters preferring male candidates may support female candidates who do not conform to their stereotypical expectations.

The effect of the baseline gender preference is also likely to depend on characteristics of the voter, including gender, political knowledge, and strength of partisanship. The political context of the voter may matter as well, since the effect of the baseline preference may depend on whether female candidates usually run in the voter's district. For example, voters in areas who regularly have an opportunity to vote for female candidates may be more likely to rely on individuating information about the candidates and less likely to stereotype. These voters may have been exposed to a variety of female candidates, and

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so they may not find gender to be a useful cue. However, even these voters may rely on candidate gender if that is the only information they have about the candidates.

In addition, more research is needed on the origins of voters’ gender schemas and how voters’ baseline gender preferences change over time. Voters may develop hypotheses about male and female candidates based on their stereotypes about men and women in society. Or their schemas may derive from past experiences with or knowledge of candidates and officeholders. The gender schemas of voters who have not had an opportunity to vote for female candidates may be based on knowledge of a few very visible women in politics, such as Hillary Rodham Clinton or Elizabeth Dole. As voters’ experiences with candidates and politicians change, or as society’s views of women and female candidates change, then voters’ preferences may change as well. Including survey items about gender stereotypes—or at least the single measure of voters’ baseline gender preference—along with questions about vote choice would go a long way in furthering our knowledge in this area.

Second, candidates often work to overcome gender stereotypes in their campaigns. For example, women may use their campaigns to demonstrate that they are tough enough for the job; men may use their campaigns to demonstrate that they are caring and understand social issues. This study suggests that in addition to overcoming these gender stereotypes, candidates must also contend with voters’ predisposition to support male or female candidates. A male or female candidate may begin a male-female race with segments of the electorate predisposed to vote for or against him or her on the basis of the candidate’s gender. The existence of this predisposition may affect the conduct of campaigns, voter reaction to the candidates, and ultimately, the candidates’ electoral fortunes. If voters’ baseline preference varies across geographic areas, then women’s electability may vary across areas as well.

Third, this study found that women are more likely than men to have a baseline preference and that they are more likely than men to prefer the female candidate. The gender affinity effect was therefore asymmetric. Women’s preference for female candidates may not be surprising. Women place greater importance than men on electing more women to politics (Cook 1994), and female candidates have affected women’s political engagement and political participation (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Hansen 1997). In addition, women may be more likely than men to endorse positive stereotypes of female candidates (Kahn 1994). The underrepresentation of women seems to have led women to want more women in office, with consequences for women’s political behavior.

The relationship between gender stereotypes and voting is complex. This work has used original data to further our understanding of the consequences of voter stereotypes. Whereas most past research has focused on either voting behavior or gender stereotypes, this study has sought to connect measures of gender stereotypes to the vote choice.

Final manuscript received July 11, 2001.

### Appendix

#### Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men emotionally suited for politics</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>.82</td>
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<td>.86</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Belief stereotype, change politics</td>
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<td>.88</td>
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<td>Issue competency, social security</td>
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<td>.48</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>48.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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References


Freivogel, Margaret Wolf. 1992. “‘Getting It’ While the Gettings Good: Female Candidates Hope to Tap the New Mood.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 26 May.


